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CASE NOTES
inspection where the stockholder cannot demonstrate his purpose to be
proper.
However, it is submitted that even in a jurisdiction having a restrictive-
type statute, assuming conditions precedent fulfilled, the result would be
the same, for clearly a stockholder has the right to take a side, seek the
support of other stockholders and express his views to the corporation,
though they are in conflict with those of management.
NELSON G. Ross
Fair Trade—Non-Signer Clauses—Standing to Sue: Contract or Tort.
—Gillette Co. v. Master. 1—Gillette brought an action to enjoin Master from
selling Gillette's products at prices below those set out in fair trade minimum
price contracts= between Gillette and other retailers. Defendant questioned
the ability of the plaintiff to bring suit arguing that the alleged violation
sounded in contract, and that because of this Gillette was precluded from
bringing the action since it had neither registered for a Certificate of
Authority,' nor paid the $250 penalty fee. 4 Gillette argued that since the
action was based on tort' its standing to sue was unaffected by the fact that
it had not obtained a Certificate of Authority. Each party based its argu-
ment on its interpretation of Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act.e
The parties stipulated that should the court find that Gillette had standing
1 408 Pa. 202, 182 A.2d 734 (1962).
See Pa. Stat. Ann, tit. 73, § 7 (1960). Section 7 provides in part:
No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears, or the
label or content of which bears, or the vending equipment from which said
commodity is sold to the consumer bears the trade-mark, brand or the name
of the producer or owner of such commodity, and which is in fair and open
competition with commodities of the same general class produced by others,
shall be deemed in violation of any law of the State of Pennsylvania by
reason of any of the following provisions which may be contained in such
contract:
(a) That the buyer will not resell such commodity, except at the price
stipulated by the vendor.
(b) That the buyer of such commodity require upon his resale of such
commodity that the purchaser from him agree that such purchaser will not in
turn resell except at the price stipulated by the vendor of the buyer.
3 Pa. Stat. Ann, tit. 15, § 2852-1001 (1958).
4 Pa. Stat. Ann, tit. 15, § 2852-1014 (1958).
5 Brief for Appellant, p. 13.
6 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 8 contains the relevant portion of section 2, Act of 1935,
P.L. 266:
Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commod-
ity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the
provisions of section one of this act, whether the person so advertising, offering
for sale, or selling is or is not, a party to such contract, is unfair competition
and is actionable at the suit of such vendor, buyer or purchaser of such
commodity.
Gillette stressed that part of the statute which stated that the offense "is unfair com-
petition and is actionable," while Master stressed "in any contract entered into .
whether the person . 	 . is, or is not, a party to such contract, .	 . is actionable."
(Emphasis supplied.)
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to sue, it could enter a preliminary injunction without hearing further proof.
Included in this stipulation was an agreement that Gillette's products were
in "fair and open" competition. The court below found that Gillette had
standing to sue, but could not enter a preliminary injunction because of the
rule in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays.7
 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.
HELD: Standing to sue for the violation of the "non-signer" provision of
Pennsylvania fair trade laws is based on the tort of unfair competition; but
parties may not stipulate a waiver of the statutory requirement of proof
of "fair and open" competition.
There is a split of authority on the question of whether standing to sue
is based on contracts or tort .° Those courts holding that the action is one
on contract reason that the "wilfull knowing" sale of goods below prices set
out in fair trade contracts constitutes an implied contract between the
manufacturer and the non-signer." The court in Downs v. Benatar's Cut
Rate Drug Stores" implied a contract between the retailer and manufacturer.
The court reasoned that although the retailer did not sign the fair trade
contract offered to him, notice of these contracts with other retailers and
knowledge of the minimum prices set forth, together with acceptance of
invoices, constituted an implied contract between the parties.
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc.' 2 it was unnecessary for the
court to decide the question because of a "retaliatory" statute in New
Jersey" imposing on foreign corporations the same obligations that are
imposed on New Jersey corporations by the foreign state." In this case it
was Indiana which forbade actions on contract and tort by an unlicensed
corporation doing business in that state." However, the court also decided
that assuming the nonexistence of the retaliatory statute, the action was
based on contract and not tort."
7 401 Pa. 413, 164 A.2d 656 (1960). Parties may not stipulate that a product is
in "fair and open" competition in Pennsylvania as a matter of statutory compliance.
For an extensive treatment of Gulf Oil see Note, 2 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 415 (1960).
8 Downs v. Benatar's Cut Rate Drug Stores, 75 Cal. App. 2d 61, 170 P.2d 88
(1946) ; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 57 N.J. Super. 291, 154 A.2d 650 (1959),
aff'd per curiam, 31 N.J. 591, 158 A.2d 528 (1960), aff'd on other grounds, 366 U.S.
276 (1961); Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co., 202 Va. 367, 117 S.E.2d 289
(1960).
Sunbeam Corp. v. Gem Jewelry Co., 157 F. Supp. 838 (D. Haw. 1957) ; Iowa
Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. May's Drug Stores, Inc., 229 Iowa 554, 294 N.W. 756 (1940);
Port Chester Wine & Liquor Shop, Inc. v. Miller Bros. Fruiterers, Inc., 281 N.Y. 101,
22 N.E.2d 253 (1939); Borden Co. v. Schreder, 182 Ore. 34, 185 P.2d 581 (1947);
Weco Prods. Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N.W. 426 (1937).
10 Downs v. Benatar's Cut Rate Drug Stores, supra note 8.
11
 Ibid.
12 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., supra note 8.
13 N.J. Stat. Ann § 14:15-5 (1940).
14 Brief for Appellant, p. 17.
15 Ind. Ann. Stat. § 25-314 (1960).
18 Supra note 8, at 305, 154 A.2d at 658.
It would seem, however, that the action is one on contract because, while the
defendant is a non-signer of a fair trade contract, it is liable under the statute
since other persons have signed such contracts. Non-signers have been held
to be bound to the same degree as signers.
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The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch'?
found it unnecessary to rule on a lower court's specific finding that the non-
signer clause was unconstitutional.' The legislature, fearing that the non-
signer clause might be declared unconstitutional, expressly made the violation .
of this clause a contract action by statute. 19 It was held constitutional in
Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co.2° The court stated that the
statute changed the "compulsion" of the non-signer clause to a "voluntary
contractual restriction." 21 It reasoned that the chief constitutional objection
had been met since it did not compel one to abide by the minimum prices,
but permitted him to enter into fair trade contracts or not, as he saw fit.22
This election, as defined by the court, amounted to the mere choice of either
purchasing or refusing the fair trade goods.
This Virginia example has been followed by Ohio. The Ohio non-signer
clause was held unconstitutional in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bar-
gain Fair, Inc." The legislature in the same year enacted a clause24 patterned
after that of Virginia. However, while the Court of Common Pleas has held
it unconstitutional, 25 the Court of Appeals has held it constitutional 26 With
the Supreme Court of Ohio having not yet ruled on the question, the con-
stitutionality of the clause is still doubtful.
Faced for the first time with the exact question concerning the nature
of the action, Pennsylvania has joined the majority in finding that the action
is a tort of unfair competition. These "tort" jurisdictions 27 rely on the land-
mark case of Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp." or, in turn, rely on cases
17 198 Va. 94, 92 S.E.2d 384 (1956).
18 Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond (1955).
18 Va. Code Ann. § 59-8.2(10) (Supp. 1960).
2(1 Supra note 8. Acceptance of manufacturer's trademarked fair traded articles
with actual notice of minimum fair trade prices constitutes a contract within sec-
tion 59-8.9 of the Virginia Code.
21 Supra note 8, at 375, 117 S.E.2d at 295.
22 Id. at 376, 117 S.E.2d at 295.
23 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.W.2d 481 (1958).
24 Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.28(1) (1962) provides in part:
Any distributor [whether he acquires such commodity directly from the
proprietor or otherwise] who, with notice that the proprietor has established
a minimum resale price for a commodity, accepts such shall thereby have entered
into an agreement with such proprietor nat to resell such commodity at less
than the minimum price stipulated therefor by such proprietor. (Emphasis
supplied.)
21 Bulova Watch Co. v. Ontario Store, 18 Ohio Op. 2d 221, 176 N.E.2d 527 (1961).
26 Hudson Distrib., Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 18 Ohio Op. 2d 182, 176 N.E.2d 246 (1961).
27 Port Chester Wine & Liquor Shop, Inc. v. Miller Bros. Fruiterers, Inc., supra
note 9; Borden Co. v. Schreder, supra note 9; Weco Prods, Co. v. Reed Drug Co.,
supra note 9.
28 299 U.S. 183, 195 (1936).
The ownership of the good will, we repeat, remains unchanged, notwithstanding
the commodity has been parted with. Section 2 (non-signer clause] of the
act dogs not prevent a purchaser of the commodity bearing the mark from
selling the commodity alone at any price he pleases. It interferes only when
he sells with the aid of the good will of the vendor; and it interferes then
only to protect that good will against injury. It proceeds upon the theory that
the sale of identified goods at less than the price fixed by the owner of the
mark or brand is an assault upon the good will, and constitutes what • the
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which cite Old Dearborn. 29
 Massachusetts 3° and Connecticut,31
 while not
having decided the issue, indicate from their reasoning in holding the non-
signer clause constitutional that the action is one of tort. It should also be
noted that the question of tort or contract is now moot in Iowa and Oregon
since each of these states has declared its non-signer clause unconstitutional."
The new New York Business Corporation Law removes any significance of
tort or contract in standing to sue since an unregistered corporation shall
not maintain any action unless authorized to do business and has paid its
taxes.33
The court in Gillette states that "it will not be denied that unfair com-
petition is a branch of the law of torts. It consists of the traditional torts
plus those which inflict some peculiar injury upon competitors." 34
 This
finding is consistent with the prior analysis of the Pennsylvania Fair Trade
Act in that the court finds: 35
Appellees' tortious conduct is three-fold: (1) by selling below the
fair trade price they assaulted the property interest—namely the
good will—of the producer which the latter still possesses notwith-
standing the conveyance of the item to the retailer . . ."° ( 2) by
tending to coerce venders of commodities bound by fair trade
contracts to lower their prices, thereby breaching their contracts
with the producer, in order to become competitive with the price
cutter . . . 37
 (3) by committing a tort per se since their knowing
and willing violation of an express statutory proscription against
price-cutting was contrary to the legislatively designated public
policy of the Commonwealth. . .38
 (Footnotes added.)
Considering Pennsylvania holdings that the purpose of its Fair Trade Act
is to protect the good will of the original manufacturer," as well as to prevent
statute denominates 'unfair competition.'
Id. at 195.
29 Sunbeam Corp. v. Gem Jewelry Co., supra note 9; Iowa Pharmaceutical Ass'n
v. May's Drug Stores, Inc., supra note 9.
3° General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 677, 132 N.E.2d 652,
658 (1956):
Trademarks, trade names, and the good will in connection with them, which
has frequently been acquired at considerable expense by various means of
advertising, had been recognized before the adoption of the fair trade law
here as valuable property rights which the owner is entitled to have protected
from those who would wrongfully impair their value.
31
 Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. Family Fair, Inc., 23 Conn. Supp. 263, 272, 181 A.2d
268, 272 (1962): "The defendant has actively participated in damaging the good will
of the plaintiff created, by its trade name, with the purchasing public."
32
 Bulova Watch Co. v. Robinson Wholesale Co., 252 Iowa 740, 108 N.W.2d 365
(1961) ; General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956).
88 N.Y. Con. Laws, Ch. 855, § 1312, effective Apr. 1, 1963.
84 Supra note 1, at 739, citing 1 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trademarks
§ 6.1, p. 105 (2d ed. 1950).
25 Supra note 1, at 739-40.
36
 Remington Arms v. Gatling, 128 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
87 Puritron Corp. v. Silo, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
38 See cases cited supra note 9.
39 Lentheric, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 338 Pa. 523, 13 A.2d 12 (1940).
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price-cutting40 and cutthroat competition," and that a violation of the non-
signer clause constitutes an assault upon the good will 42 of the manufacturer
causing him to suffer irreparable harm," it seems that Pennsylvania has
always regarded the action to be one of tort although never having decided
the point.
The effect of this decision is to enable a foreign corporation to bring
an action for the violation of the non-signer clause of the Pennsylvania Fair
Trade Act without having to obtain a Certificate of Authority to do busi-
ness in the state. If Gillette had registered with the state, or paid the
statutory penalty of $250 and obtained the Certificate of Authority, the
question of standing to sue would not have arisen. In order to realize the
effect of this decision, it is necessary to consider the effect of registration
of foreign corporations as to standing to sue on contract and as to tax
liability. If Gillette had not registered and was not actually doing business
within the Commonwealth there would be no bar to an action on contract."
In order to be subjected to a franchise tax,'" a foreign corporation must be
both registered" and doing business 47 within Pennsylvania. Since the action
Was found to be based on tort, the required element of registration for tax
purposes is not necessary to maintain this type of action. As a result, the
foreign corporation avoids certain tax liability even if it were doing business
within the Commonwealth. In view of this, it is clear that the foreign cor-
poration which is doing business in Pennsylvania will receive a definite tax
advantage and still retain the power to enforce the non-signatory clause of
the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act.
The decision in the Gillette case appears to be correct. It is in line with
what this writer feels is the stronger and more reasonable view. The nature
of the conduct, which the statute sets out as a violation of the non-signer
clause, seems to fit more readily into the elements of tort than those of
implied contract. However, this writer also agrees with the attitude expressed
by Chief Judge Gourley in Remington Arms v. Galling."
FREDERICK J. MCLOUGHLIN, JR.
4° Bristol-Myers v. Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 (1939).
41 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays, supra note 7.
42 Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. L. & H. Stores, Inc., 392 Pa. 225, 139 A.2d 897
(1958).
43 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Schwartz, 398 Pa. 60, 157 A.2d 63 (1959).
44 Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Hess Bros., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 Trade Cas.)
I[ 70096, at 78,402 (Pa. C.P. Lehigh County 1960). Unregistered corporation had
standing to sue for enforcement of fair trade contract since it was not "doing business"
within the state.
45 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, Sec. 1871(b) (Supp. 1961).
46
 Hoffman Constr. Co. v. Erwin, 331 Pa. 384, 386, 200 Atl. 579, 580 (1938). "The
purpose of the [Business Corporation] Act of 1933 . . . is also to bring such [foreign]
corporations within our tax laws."
47 Commonwealth v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 47 Pa. D. & C. 273, 53 Dauph. 219
(1943). The fact that a foreign corporation is registered to do business in Pennsylvania
does not of itself subject it to the Pennsylvania foreign franchise tax; a registered
corporation must also be doing business.
48 Supra note 36, at 228: "It has always been my personal conviction that the
enactment of Fair Trade legislation among the different states stifles competition and
unduly impinges upon a free and untrammeled economy. But the constitutionality of
state fair trade legislation is established."
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